Rushing v. Thigpen
Supreme Court of Georgia
1Opinion of the Court
Jenkins, Presiding Justice.
1. A nuisance per se is an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings. Simpson v. DuPont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 465, 466 (85 S. E. 344, L. R. A. 1915E, 430); Wilson v. Evans Hotel Co., 188 Ga. 498, 500 (4 S. E. 2d, 155, 124 A. L. R. 373).
2. This court has several times held that garages- and filling- stations in a residence neighborhood do not constitute a nuisance per se. Standard Oil Co. v. Kahn, 165 Ga. 575 (141 S. E. 643); City of Hawkinsville v. Williams, 185 Ga. 396, 399 (195…
2Cases cited6 opinions
- Standard Oil Co. v. KahnSupreme Court of Georgia · 1928
- Simpson v. DuPont Powder Co.Supreme Court of Georgia · 1915
- Morrow v. City of AtlantaSupreme Court of Georgia · 1926
- Wilson v. Evans Hotel Co.Supreme Court of Georgia · 1939
- City of Hawkinsville v. WilliamsSupreme Court of Georgia · 1938
1 more not listed; retrieve them via the Exa API.
3Cited by5 opinions
- Elder v. City of WinderSupreme Court of Georgia · 1946
- Davis v. DearisoSupreme Court of Georgia · 1954
- Carroll v. LovettSupreme Court of Georgia · 1958
- Tucker v. City of OcillaSupreme Court of Georgia · 1952
- Roberts v. RichSupreme Court of Georgia · 1946