Commonwealth v. Chapman
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
1DissentMarshall, C.J.
(dissenting, with whom Ireland, J., joins). “[A]s a matter of fundamental fairness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a finding that an individual is no longer sexually dangerous must be as immune from subsequent or collateral attack as is a criminal judgment of acquittal.”1 Commonwealth v. Travis, 372 Mass. 238, 249 (1977) (Travis). In 1991, under the then existing provisions of G. L. c. 123A, § 9,2 a judge in the Superior Court found that the Commonwealth had “not met its *26burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Wayne…
2Cases cited15 opinions
- Daniels v. WilliamsSupreme Court of the United States · 1986
- Zinermon v. BurchSupreme Court of the United States · 1990
- Addington v. TexasSupreme Court of the United States · 1979
- Kansas v. HendricksSupreme Court of the United States · 1997
- Foucha v. LouisianaSupreme Court of the United States · 1992
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