Wager v. Stickle
New York Court of Chancery
This was an application to set aside an order taking the bill as confessed. The default of the defendant was occasioned by the supposition on the part of his solicitor that he had made an agreement with the solicitor of the adverse party, by paroi, to extend the time for answering.
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This was an application to set aside an order taking the bill as confessed. The default of the defendant was occasioned by the supposition on the part of his solicitor that he had made an agreement with the solicitor of the adverse party, by paroi, to extend the time for answering. The defendant swore to a defence on the merits; and that he had also applied to the solicitor of the adverse party to waive the default, and had offered to pay the costs of such default, and to stipulate to expedite the proceedings so as to prevent any injury from the delay. ,,
1Opinion of the Court
The Chancellor.
The object of the 121st rule ivas to pre-elude the parties from raising the question, upon affidavits, as to the fact of an agreement, or consent, relative to the proceedings in a cause, which was not evidenced by writing; and thus to relieve the court from the necessity o£ settling such & question upon conflicting affidavits, as well as to prevent controversies between the solicitors. Much of the. contention between gentlemen of the profession arises out of paroi agreements of this kind, and is produced-by a misapprehension, by one party, as to what was actually intended to be…
2Cited by7 opinions
- In re the Estate of CohenNew York Surrogate's Court · 1933
- Spilman, Adams & Co. v. GilpinSupreme Court of Virginia · 1896
- Waldron v. City of St. PaulSupreme Court of Minnesota · 1885
- Burnham v. SmithWisconsin Supreme Court · 1860
- Gasper v. AdamsNew York Supreme Court · 1857
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