Connor v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R.
Supreme Court of Missouri
I. Taking section 2 of the damage act as a whole, it is plain that it was designed, not to give a right of action, where none existed before, but to fix and limit the damages recoverable by the representative of a passenger from a common carrier, for injuries resulting in death, received either through the carrier or his servants.
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I. Taking section 2 of the damage act as a whole, it is plain that it was designed, not to give a right of action, where none existed before, but to fix and limit the damages recoverable by the representative of a passenger from a common carrier, for injuries resulting in death, received either through the carrier or his servants. And the liability of such carrier is rather restricted than enlarged; for the section provides that it shall be a sufficient defense to show that the defect or insufficiency was not a negligent defect or insufficiency. II. Conceding that the word “ person ” in § 2,…
1Dissent
Wagner, Judge,
delivered the following dissenting opinion.
I concur in reversing the judgment on the last point discussed in the above opinion; but I do not wish to be understood as assenting to anything that goes to impair the authority of the case of Schultz vs. Pacific Railroad, and in this I am requested to say that Judges Vories and Sherwood agree with me.
Per Hough, Judge.
I concur in reversing the judgment in this case, but as I entertain a view of the construction which should be given to the second section of the damage act, upon which the plaintiff’s action is founded, different from…
2Cases cited13 opinions
- Barbaroux v. BarkerCourt of Appeals of Kentucky · 1862
- Gibson v. Pacific RailroadSupreme Court of Missouri · 1870
- Devitt v. Pacific RailroadSupreme Court of Missouri · 1872
- Shields v. YongeSupreme Court of Georgia · 1854
- Harper v. Indianapolis & St. Louis RailroadSupreme Court of Missouri · 1871
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