State v. Wagstaff
Arizona Supreme Court
1DissentCameron, Justice
I regret that I must dissent. I believe that even though parole has traditionally been an executive function, no constitutional doctrine prohibits the courts from exercising this responsibility. Indeed, parole, being quasi-judicial in nature, could be as much of a judicial function as probation is today. I find nothing in our constitution to prevent the legislature from conferring this responsibility upon the judiciary.
*4941. Does the Judiciary Have Statutory Authority to Grant Parole?
Statutes are presumed constitutional and the burden of proof is on the opponent of the statute to show it…
2Cases cited19 opinions
- Eastin v. BroomfieldArizona Supreme Court · 1977
- Chevron Chemical Co. v. Superior CourtArizona Supreme Court · 1982
- State v. SweetArizona Supreme Court · 1985
- United States v. Walter L. Jones, United States of America v. Calvin BainesCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 1976
- Pima County v. HeinfeldArizona Supreme Court · 1982
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