Dorman v. Kellam
New York Supreme Court
Appeal from a judgment of the special term sustaining a demurrer to a complaint. The action was by Daniel D. Dorman against Jeptha Kellam. The complaint was upon two promissory notes made by the defendant payable to bearer, and transferred to the firm of Dorman & Berg, of which firm the plaintiff was surviving partner. The notes were set forth in the complaint together, in one count or statement.
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Appeal from a judgment of the special term sustaining a demurrer to a complaint. The action was by Daniel D. Dorman against Jeptha Kellam. The complaint was upon two promissory notes made by the defendant payable to bearer, and transferred to the firm of Dorman & Berg, of which firm the plaintiff was surviving partner. The notes were set forth in the complaint together, in one count or statement. Copies of the notes were given in the complaint, and these were numbered I. and II. respectively; but there was no other attempt to state them separately, or as distinct causes of action. The…
1Opinion of the Court
By the Court,* Balcom, J.
—The only important question in this case is, whether the complaint is demurrable for the reason that it contains two causes of action upon two promissory notes, which causes of action are numbered, but not separately stated, as they should be according to Rule 86 of the Supreme Court (Code, § 167, subd. 7).
Several causes of action are improperly united in a complaint when they differ in character (Moore a. Smith, 10 How. Pr. R., 361). To illustrate;—a cause of action upon a promissory note and one for an assault and battery cannot be united in the same complaint.…
2Cases cited2 opinions
- Boyce v. BrownNew York Supreme Court · 1849
- Clark v. FarleyThe Superior Court of New York City · 1854
3Cited by1 opinion
- Bass v. . ComstockNew York Court of Appeals · 1868