Abstract
We must really decide whether we are telling a human story against the background of a military campaign, or whether we are telling the story of that campaign itself. The present treatment simply postpones that decision, because it gives us both sides of the story at such length that it would make two entire movies. 1 I must reiterate that the major disappointment is in the characterisations, both civilians and soldiers. 2 This article asks the question: what went wrong with Dunkirk (1958)? Why isn't this ambitious film remembered as the pinnacle of Ealing's achievement and a fitting memorial to an event which has become integral to mythologies of the British nation? The production did not lack resources. Backed by a new joint production arrangement with MGM, the film was closely superintended by Michael Balcon, who confessed in a letter to screenwriter David Divine that he had 'a passion for the subject'. 3 The film enjoyed the full cooperation of Army and Admiralty, and was cast with familiar faces capable themselves of attracting an audience. Yet Dunkirk received only a lukewarm critical reception and has, since its release, attracted the bare minimum of critical attention. 4 The reasons for this somewhat bathetic end to an enormous project are manifold. Balcon was and screenplay, the prospect of competing films and the failure to secure Jack Hawkins in a central role. 5 Yet, as Kenneth Tynan's memo suggests, the film's problems were also structural: its epic intentions burdened it with representational obligations almost impossible to satisfy. Military campaigns are not easy to depict on screen, and ambitions to 'tell the truth and nothing but the truth' do not sit easily with the demands of effective story telling. 6 Indeed, the film in conception should be seen as two films: an original, less ambitious project, devised under the working title The Big Pick-Up, and the later Dunkirk, which placed this story within a much larger, self-consciously historical, framework. The conflict between epic and intimacy was one problem. Another was the relative historical proximity of the Dunkirk evacuation. Many of the military personnel depicted in the film were still alive; others had family understandably concerned about the dangers of posthumous misrepresentation. Archival correspondence makes it clear that everybody, from the Dunkirk Veterans Association to the French Navy, felt they had a vested interest in the film, and although Balcon and Associate Producer Michael Forlong worked hard to reassure all concerned, the film's release nonetheless generated a heated debate about the authenticity of its representations. Responding to the controversy in a letter to The Times a month after the film's premiere, Balcon and director Leslie Norman concluded that: 'Three hundred and thirty-eight thousand had stories to tell and we had but two and a quarter hours in which to translate some of them to the screen.' 7 In spite of this disclaimer, the film strives for maximum inclusivity at the same time as it treads with extreme care in the depiction of the armed forces, criticising policy 'back home' rather than military actions or decisions. This element of dutiful memorialising is perhaps what prompts Charles Barr to describe the film as 'very dull indeed ' (1998: 179) : How right that Ealing at the end of its span should look back to the event which in effect had made it what it was: to Dunkirk, the turningpoint of the war, the transforming event which we look back on in the same wistful spirit with which we look back on the classic Ealing films themselves . . . The film shows a dispirited, sluggish country blundering its way to disaster -a picture consistent with the films Ealing was making in those years. (Ibid.) As this analysis suggests, the film's relationship to both historical and cinematic past is complex, but it is also fraught with difficulty arising from the broader context of its production. Beyond all the technical issues encountered in its planning, Dunkirk is permeated with tensions that speak as much to the cultural changes and class anxieties of the mid-1950s as they do to the 1940 evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from France. Dunkirk's attempt at neutral historicising disguises a notinconsiderable nostalgia, most clearly evident in its attempt to reconstruct the 'group hero' characteristic of Second World War cinema. As I will demonstrate by a comparison with an early example of the group-hero narrative, Noel Coward's In Which We Serve (1942) , Dunkirk struggles with the effective presentation of both the group and the working-class men who comprise it. While this is, in part, the product of scripting issues which seem never to have been resolved, it also speaks to the impossibility of historical verisimilitude and the inevitable instability of repetition. While the film attempts to embrace all possible dimensions of the campaign and its human stories, it can only do so from the perspective of 1956-7, the years of planning and production. Its group hero is, therefore, not that which emerged in the cinema of the critical war years 1940-3, but rather a version shaped by what Neil Rattigan has described as 'the last gasp of the middle class ' (1994: 143) . The years between Dunkirk as event and Dunkirk as cinema were, in terms of both class and nation, complicated by a rear-guard action fought by a once secure but now somewhat beleaguered establishment. Ross McKibbin has suggested that the Second World War regenerated a traditional working class eviscerated by the economic and political failures of the 1920s and, in so doing, weakened the 'modern' middle class whose outlook had predominantly shaped the 1930s. By 1951 this had resulted in the paradox of a society characterised by previously unthinkable social welfare reforms built upon fundamentally unchanged institutional structures (1998: 528-36) . 8 McKibbin concludes that this was a balance which could not hold, and indeed, a decade later, the politics of Britain, its international status, its society, its culture and its cinema would all have undergone far-reaching and radical change. Perhaps the most obvious benchmarks of transition were the humiliation of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the emergence of the 'angry young man' as embodied in John Osborne's Jimmy Porter in Look Back in Anger, which opened at London's Royal Court Theatre in May that year. It is events such as these, simultaneously encoding an international loss of status and a domestic loss of stability within established middle-class structures of deference, which lead Neil Rattigan to posit a middle-class backlash. Arguing that it was no longer necessary for film-makers to 'foster notions . . . of social and cultural solidarity in order to unite the country to meet the demands of a people's war ' (1994: 148) , he suggests that cinema gradually saw 'the people' replaced by the middle classes in a 'last ditch effort by the dominant class to maintain its hegemony by rewriting the history of the celluloid war in its own favour and offering this as a remembrance of the way things were' (ibid.: 150). War films were the pre-eminent genre of the decade, and although they depicted the so called 'people's war', more often than not, argues Rattigan, they were fundamentally concerned with putting the 'people' back in their place. And somehow, in spite of having a major star in a central working-class role, Dunkirk manages to do exactly that. The star in question was John Mills, who had been linked to the project from its initial conception as The Big Pick-Up, and the film is in many respects typical of the wartime narratives in which he excelled. Dunkirk is an ensemble drama in which three characters together represent a snapshot of the nation. Mills is the chirpy working-class soldier, Corporal Tubby Binns, stationed in France as part of the BEF. Richard Attenborough is Mr Holden, henpecked husband, new father and complacent incumbent of a reserved occupation: a character who cannot see beyond his own backyard. Finally, there is Bernard Lee as Charles Foreman, a journalist who becomes increasingly sceptical about the management of the war. Foreman is the film's educated middle-class mouthpiece. He sets the moral tone, points out the failures of communication and strategy -reminding the audience of the mistakes of appeasement -and, as the film progresses, emerges as the leader of the civilian war effort. These three characters are each pulled into the drama of Dunkirk and will eventually meet on the beach in what is arguably the crux of the narrative. For Mills' and Attenborough's characters, there is a journey to be undertaken. Tubby, reluctantly left in charge by the death of his officer, must lead his motley platoon through the advancing German lines to 'safety' on the beaches. Mr Holden must throw off the shackles of domesticity, abandon his political blinkers, rediscover his masculinity and sail his small boat to Dunkirk. Mr Foreman, who is already all-seeing and adequately masculine, must also sail to Dunkirk -but not for the purpose of personal development. Rather he sets an example for the reluctant Holden and, on arrival, educates Tubby on the subject of international politics before being shot by a passing Stuka. Tubby and Holden live to fight another day, but the conclusions of their stories are also profoundly gender and class normative. Holden's flagging masculinity is restored by his actions and through mistaken identity when, on returning to England, he is inadvertently interpellated as a soldier. The emasculating effect of his wife has been counteracted through appropriately masculine agency. And finally Tubby, after his brief outing as a leader of men, is shown restored to his appropriate class position, square-bashing with the rank and file. Arguably there are two group heroes in Dunkirk; the one comprised of the roles filled by the star performers, John Mills, Richard Attenborough and Bernard Lee; the other, a more conventional military group made up of the platoon struggling to find its way back to the beaches. The first group is designed to be symbolic: three different types of men, living radically different lives, bring contrasting perspectives to bear on the monumental historical event of the evacuation. The cross-class constitution of this group stands in marked contrast to the wholly working-class contingent comprising the second group. The typical group hero of early-1940s narrative incorporated class, regional and temperamental diversity, and neither of Dunkirk's two groups conforms neatly to this template. In the case of the first group, the characters' symbolic function dominates; they come together only towards the close of the film and have little opportunity to bond. For the second group, the problem is one of homogeneity: the characters making up the platoon are indistinguishable. Yet both groups attempt to recreate aspects of the original group hero function: they represent ordinary people working together to achieve extraordinary things, and they aim to give the spectator recognisable figures with whom to identify in the otherwise overwhelming historical narrative. The difficulty of constructing a viable group hero in the context of Dunkirk's monumental memorialising is evident in pre-production debates about the screenplay. Kenneth Tynan complained about a lack of effective characterisation as early as February 1956, and Leslie Norman's notes on Sherriff's screenplay reiterate this point. David Divine's assumption of screenwriting duties did not solve the problem, and in September 1956 Michael Forlong is concerned that the script fails to generate an interest in the three soldiers Binns, Bellman and Mike. 9 Balcon shares this reservation, noting in January 1957 that the relationships sustaining the group of soldiers in the original draft of The Big Pick-Up have been lost, with the result that the 'death of Bellman . . . does not involve us emotionally because we know so little about him'. 10 These problems were not resolved, and in the final product only Tubby Binns and his sidekick Mike emerge as recognisable characters. While Tubby's adventures might be regarded as a democratic resurgence of the individual working-class hero, I will argue that in fact both the role of Binns and the casting of John Mills work against any such outcome. Focusing on the meanings encoded by the actor as a 'cumulative cultural product' (Plain 2006: 9) , I will suggest that in the casting of John Mills, the film-makers were not recreating the group hero of the 1940s but, rather, were burdening their film with a star whose mode of working-class performance had come to have comic rather than heroic connotations. 11 Tubby Binns, as embodied by the 50-year-old John Mills, cannot be the modern working-class hero about to emerge as part of the British New Wave, but neither can he re-inhabit the once-radical workingclass masculinity of his performances in the 1940s. Instead, Mills' presence on the screen adds a further layer of complexity to an already contradictory and underwritten role. Exploring Tubby Binns thus provides insight into the tensions at the heart of Dunkirk, a film which, in both generic structure and performance convention, does not know the story it is telling.
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