State v. Falcone
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
1DissentDana, J.
[¶ 21] Because this Court admits that domicile is a “somewhat elusive concept,” see Margani v. Sanders, 453 A.2d 501, 503 (1982), yet by this decision authorizes the State to employ this murky concept to charge people with crimes, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 22] Criminal statutes must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited .... ” State v. McLaughlin, 2002 ME 55, ¶ 9, 794 A.2d 69, 72 (quotation marks omitted); see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972)…
2Cases cited16 opinions
- Papachristou v. City of JacksonvilleSupreme Court of the United States · 1972
- Lanzetta v. New JerseySupreme Court of the United States · 1939
- Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. NewmanCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 1947
- Belanger v. BelangerSupreme Judicial Court of Maine · 1968
- Holyoke v. Estate of HolyokeSupreme Judicial Court of Maine · 1913
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