Bill HARNESS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARTZ MOUNTAIN CORP., Defendant-Appellee
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
1DissentDavid A. Nelson, Circuit Judge
I should like to concur, but the unambiguous language of the Kentucky statute makes it difficult for me to do so.
Hartz Mountain’s leave policy, as the court’s opinion acknowledges, unquestionably discriminates in favor of pregnant employees. This is discrimination “because of sex,” within the meaning of those words as used in the Kentucky statute, because the statute explicitly says so: “The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include ... because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions_” KRS § 344.030(6).
In a world governed by common sense, one…
2Cases cited10 opinions
- Erie Railroad v. TompkinsSupreme Court of the United States · 1938
- Church of the Holy Trinity v. United StatesSupreme Court of the United States · 1892
- General Electric Co. v. GilbertSupreme Court of the United States · 1976
- Plessy v. FergusonSupreme Court of the United States · 1896
- United Steelworkers of America v. WeberSupreme Court of the United States · 1979
5 more not listed; retrieve them via the Exa API.