Cornell v. Donovan
City of New York Municipal Court
It is practically conceded that the plaintiff is entitled to recover $250 from the defendants on the undertaking executed by them, less $107.65 paid on account of such liability, leaving $142.35 due, with $5.60 interest thereon, aggregating $147.95. The contention is whether the defendants are entitled to their counterclaim.
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It is practically conceded that the plaintiff is entitled to recover $250 from the defendants on the undertaking executed by them, less $107.65 paid on account of such liability, leaving $142.35 due, with $5.60 interest thereon, aggregating $147.95. The contention is whether the defendants are entitled to their counterclaim. The defendant Donovan recovered a judgment in this court against, the plaintiff, May 5, 1886, for $867.31, on which there is now due $729.66. On May 12, 1886, Donovan assigned to the co-defendant, Denis Harrington, one-third of said judgment, and to the other defendant,…
1Opinion of the CourtMcAdam, C. J.
That a judgment may be used as a counterclaim is conceded (Boston Mills v. Eull, 6 Abb. [N. S.], 319; Chamboret v. Cagney, 10 id., 31; Taylor v. The Mayor, 82 N. Y., 10), and how far the purpose of making the assignment of the judgment defeats its use as a counterclaim, is the question raised. The practice of set-off is of equitable origin. It was recognized in equity long before it was known in courts of law. The want of it in legal contentions was found productive of great injustice, a circumstance that ultimately led to the enactment of statutes permitting set-offs to be pleaded in common…
2Cases cited6 opinions
- Sheridan v. Mayor of New YorkNew York Court of Appeals · 1876
- Taylor v. . Mayor, Etc., City of New YorkNew York Court of Appeals · 1880
- Newell v. Salmons & WashburnNew York Supreme Court · 1856
- Parsons v. NashNew York Supreme Court · 1853
- Gilman v. Van SlyckNew York Supreme Court · 1827
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