Daniels Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner
United States Tax Court
Held, petitioner is not a "purchasing corporation" within the meaning of section 474(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, since it did not purchase substantially all of the properties (other than cash) of another corporation, and therefore is not entitled to use the base period experience of that corporation in computing its excess profits credit for the year 1951.
1Opinion of the Court
OPINION.
Tietjens, Judge:
Petitioner contends that it acquired “substantially all the properties (other than cash) of another corporation” and is therefore a “purchasing corporation” within the intent of section 474 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,1 and is entitled to utilize the earnings experience of the “selling corporation,” here Kelley Buick, in computing its excess profits credit based on income, for purposes of the Excess Profits Tax Act of I960.
Section 474 was added to subchapter D of chapter 1 of the 1939 Code by section 521 of the Revenue Act of 1951. Its application was limited…
2Cases cited3 opinions
- In Re PalliserSupreme Court of the United States · 1890
- R. & J. Furniture Co. v. CommissionerUnited States Tax Court · 1953
- The R. & J. Furniture Company v. Commissioner of Internal RevenueCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1955
3Cited by10 opinions
- Daniels Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal RevenueCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1958
- Dixie Portland Flour Co. v. CommissionerUnited States Tax Court · 1958
- Dudderar v. CommissionerUnited States Tax Court · 1965
- Loewen v. CommissionerUnited States Tax Court · 1981
- Virginia Stevedoring Corp. v. CommissionerUnited States Tax Court · 1958
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