Earnest Woods, Ii v. Santos Cervantes

Because it runs counter to the plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)’s text, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s circuit-splitting opinion. See Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 916-18 (6th Cir.2004) (holding § 1997e(d)(2)’s 150% cap includes any attorney fees a prisoner incurs defending a monetary judgment on appeal).

I. I begin with § 1997(d)’s text, and give its terms their ordinary meaning. Synagogue v. United States, 482 F.3d 1058, 1061-62 (9th Cir.2007).

Section 1997e(d)(l) provides that in “any action brought by a prisoner ... in which attorney’s fees are authorized,” attorney fees…