Legal Opinion · Dissent

Gillis v. Palmer

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Decided March 21, 1986No. 71068Published

1DissentBirdsong, Presiding Judge

1. I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that in an action for medical malpractice the statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the alleged precipitating negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred, rather than the date of the injury to the plaintiff resulting from that precipitating act.

In Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 57 (316 SE2d 155), the Supreme Court accepted as the date of inception of the running of the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action an injury that did not occur until more than three years after the alleged negligent act because the…

2Cases cited12 opinions

  1. Urie v. ThompsonSupreme Court of the United States · 1949
  2. Oliver v. OliverSupreme Court of Georgia · 1903
  3. Shessel v. StroupSupreme Court of Georgia · 1984
  4. Stephen W. Brown Radiology Associates v. GowersCourt of Appeals of Georgia · 1981
  5. Sutlive v. HackneyCourt of Appeals of Georgia · 1982

7 more not listed; retrieve them via the Exa API.

Showing a preview — retrieve the full document via the Exa API.

Powered by the Exa API