Lightspeed of Miami, Inc. v. Jack Eckerd Corp.

(specially concurring).

I agree with reversal as to both appel-lees. I would make it clear, however, that, quite apart from Eckerd’s rights under its own lease, a genuine issue, resolvable only by extrinsic evidence, is ■ presented as to whether a proper interpretation of Light-speed’s lease obligated the landlord to prohibit Eckerd’s competitive activity, see Liza Danielle, Inc. v. Jamko, Inc., 408 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see generally Quayside Assocs., Ltd. v. Harbor Club Villas Condominium Ass’n, 419 So.2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981);…