Legal Opinion · Dissent

Altermatts Painting v. Subsequent Injury Trust Fund

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Decided December 5, 1995No. A95A1674Published

1DissentRuffin, Judge

I respectfully dissent because I agree with Altermatts that the reimbursement agreement did not exist prior to its approval by the Board on November 10. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed.) defines “exist” as “to have real being . . .” and “to have life or the functions of vitality.” Here, the agreement had no material being until it was approved by the Board because there was no obligation for the Fund to make payments until such approval was achieved. See OCGA § 34-9-363 which provides that after an agreement has been reached with respect to reimbursement, “it shall be . . . submitted…

2Cases cited2 opinions

  1. Gilbert v. RichardsonSupreme Court of Georgia · 1994
  2. Bekaert Steel Wire Corp. v. Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust FundCourt of Appeals of Georgia · 1989

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