Bomely v. Mid-America Corp.
Tennessee Supreme Court
1Concurring in part, dissenting in partHolder, Justice
I agree with the majority’s holding that an employee who is permanently and totally disabled is entitled to receive benefits until age 65. I dissent, however because: (1) I believe the majority’s analysis of the proper division between the employer and the Second Injury Fund substitutes a judicially-created policy of “equitable division” for the clear and established legislative policy that dictated the Second Injury Fund legislation; and (2) I disagree with the majority’s approach in finding both subsection (a) and (b) applicable in cases of permanent total disability.
DIVISION BETWEEN…
2Cases cited8 opinions
- Cronin v. HoweTennessee Supreme Court · 1995
- Lyons v. RasarTennessee Supreme Court · 1994
- Epstein v. StateTennessee Supreme Court · 1963
- Perry v. Sentry Insurance Co.Tennessee Supreme Court · 1996
- Henson v. City of LawrenceburgTennessee Supreme Court · 1993
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