Davis v. Thompson
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Exceptions from the Court of Common Pleas. This was a process under the statute of forcible entry and detainer, originally commenced before a Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, in which the complainants alleged seisin of certain land and buildings, in Augusta, by virtue of a deed from Caleb S. Carter to them, dated March 2, 1835. The respondent pleaded title in himself by virtue of a lease from said Carter, to him, commencing on the first day of October, 1834, to…
Read the full summary
Exceptions from the Court of Common Pleas. This was a process under the statute of forcible entry and detainer, originally commenced before a Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, in which the complainants alleged seisin of certain land and buildings, in Augusta, by virtue of a deed from Caleb S. Carter to them, dated March 2, 1835. The respondent pleaded title in himself by virtue of a lease from said Carter, to him, commencing on the first day of October, 1834, to continue two years. The complainants, to maintain the process on their part, introduced a deed from said Carter, dated March…
1Opinion of the Court
Weston C. J.
The propositions made in writing by the defendant to Hamlen, who had been requested by Carter to procure them, and the letter from the latter to Hamlen, accepting the terms proposed, although in reference to an interest in real estate, may be evidence of an agreement in writing required by the statute of frauds, and binding upon both parties. Many of the cases cited for the defendant, sustain this. position. But a more important inquiry is, whether it amounts to a lease; or *213merely an agreement to demise, between which there is a clear distinction.
In Baxter v. Browne, 2 Bl. Rep.…
2Cited by3 opinions
- Barlow v. WainwrightSupreme Court of Vermont · 1849
- Towne v. BowersSupreme Court of Missouri · 1884
- Treadway v. SharonNevada Supreme Court · 1871