First National Bank of Canandaigua v. Garlinghouse
New York Supreme Court
THE defendant, who was a married woman, confessed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, as if she "were a feme sole. The judgment being entered in due form, she moved, at a special term, to set it aside. The court set aside the judgment, on the ground that a married woman could not confess a valid judgment; and the plaintiff appealed to the general term.
1Opinion of the CourtE. Darwin Smith, J.
The order at special term, setting aside the judgment in this action, was made and based, as appears from the opinion of the learned judge then delivered, upon the express ground that a married woman could not confess a judgment. This was undoubtedly so, at common law. (Brittin v. Wilder, 6 Mill, 242. 3 T. R. 151. Watkins v. Abrahams, 24 N. Y. Rep. 72.) The reason for this rule at common law is quite apparent. A married woman was under disability, like an infant. She could not confess a judgment, because she could not appoint an attorney. She could not sue or be sued alone, at law. She could…
2Cases cited3 opinions
- Yale v. . DedererNew York Court of Appeals · 1860
- Barton v. BeerNew York Supreme Court · 1861
- Watkins v. . AbrahamsNew York Court of Appeals · 1861
3Cited by9 opinions
- Coe v. RitterSupreme Court of Missouri · 1885
- Williamson v. ClineWest Virginia Supreme Court · 1895
- Adams v. CurtisNew York Supreme Court · 1870
- Commonwealth Ex Rel. Bradford County v. LynchSuperior Court of Pennsylvania · 1941
- Heywood v. ShreveSupreme Court of New Jersey · 1882
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