Norris v. Morrill
Supreme Court of New Hampshire
Upon tbe trial of tliis action, it became a material question whether thei’e had been such a demand of rent and such a neglect to pay as would justify a seven days’ notice to quit, under the statute in relation to landlords and tenants. The plaintiff had been notified to quit on the 20th of May, 1857, by a notice which was served on the 12th of that month.
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Upon tbe trial of tliis action, it became a material question whether thei’e had been such a demand of rent and such a neglect to pay as would justify a seven days’ notice to quit, under the statute in relation to landlords and tenants. The plaintiff had been notified to quit on the 20th of May, 1857, by a notice which was served on the 12th of that month. It appeared that the plaintiff came into possession in September, 1856, and remained a year or thereabouts without interruption, except by an entry by the defendant, on the 25th of May, 1857, and an attempt to remove the plaintiff’s livery…
1Opinion of the CourtBartlett, J.
If by “ calling for rent or asking for rent in the ordinary way” be meant the use of terms requesting a present payment of it, cases can be conceived where such terms may be employed, and yet no demand be intended or made. If the phrase means calling for the rent as men ordinarily do, it involves a question of fact. We think the statement of facts was not sufficient to enable the court to say that, as matter of law, they necessarily amounted to a demand. If it was understood by the parties that no demand was intended, or if the lessor intended none, there would be no demand, whatever terms…
2Cases cited3 opinions
- Jackson ex dem. Blanchard v. AllenNew York Supreme Court · 1824
- Hunter v. OsterhoudtNew York Supreme Court · 1851
- Jackson ex dem. Norton v. SheldonNew York Supreme Court · 1826
3Cited by1 opinion
- Globe Distributors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. (In Re Globe Distributors, Inc.)United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Hampshire · 1991