Volpe v. Gallagher
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
1Dissent
SHEA, Justice (Ret.),
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion presupposes that defendant, by merely granting her adult son permission to live in her house, automatically was conferred with the ability to control his actions. Such a conclusion would render Restatement (Second) Torts § 318(a) (1965) meaningless because the duty to control the conduct of a licensee is imposed only after it is establishéd that the licensor “knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the [licensee].” The case law that follows demonstrates that mere permission to remain on the…
2Cases cited17 opinions
- Alioto v. MarnellMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 1988
- Ferreira v. StrackSupreme Court of Rhode Island · 1995
- Kaminski v. Town of FairfieldSupreme Court of Connecticut · 1990
- Gill v. New York City Housing AuthorityAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · 1987
- Youngblood v. SchiremanCourt of Appeals of Washington · 1988
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