Burras v. Looker
New York Court of Chancery
This Was on appeal from the decretal order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, allowing certain amendments to the complainant’s bill. The amendments were allowed after an answer had been put in to the original bill; and among the amendments was one by which the complainant waived an answer on oath to the amended bill.
1Opinion of the Court
The Chancellor.
I think the complainant, under the peculiar state of facts disclosed in the affidavits, should be permitted to amend his bill, so far as the new allegations extend. But he ought not to have been allowed to insert that part of the amendment by which an answer on oath was waived. The statute authorizing the complainant to waive the necessity of an answer on oath from the defendant, (2 R. S. 175, § 44,) has introduced a new principle into the system of equity pleading. This provision was incorporated into the revised statutes upon my suggestion; and was intended to leave it…
2Cited by7 opinions
- Kempton v. BurgessMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · 1883
- Stevens v. The RailroadsUnited States Circuit Court · 1880
- Kean v. LathropSupreme Court of Georgia · 1877
- Armstrong v. ScottSupreme Court of Iowa · 1852
- Carpenter v. BensonNew York Court of Chancery · 1847
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